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Abstract
We propose a model for price formation in financial markets based on clearing of a stan-
dard call auction with random orders, and verify its validity for prediction of the daily
closing price distribution statistically. The model considers random buy and sell orders,
placed following demand- and supply-side valuation distributions; an equilibrium equa-
tion then leads to a distribution for clearing price and transacted volume. Bid and ask
volumes are left as free parameters, permitting possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed order
flow conditions. In highly liquid auctions, the clearing price distribution converges to an
asymptotically normal central limit, with mean and variance in terms of supply/demand-
valuation distributions and order flow imbalance. By means of simulations, we illustrate
the influence of variations in order flow and valuation distributions on price/volume, not-
ing a distinction between high- and low-volume auction price variance. To verify the
validity of the model statistically, we predict a year’s worth of daily closing price distri-
butions for 5 constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index; Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and
QQ-plots demonstrate with ample statistical significance that the model predicts clos-
ing price distributions accurately, and compares favourably with alternative methods of
prediction.
1 Introduction
In modern financial markets most securities are traded in continuous double auctions. During
the trading day a sell/buy order for a price lower/higher than or equal to the best bid/ask
price is immediately executed versus the limit order book on the bid/ask side. If a sell/buy-
order has a price higher/lower than the best bid/ask, it is added to the limit order book
on the ask/bid side. To start and stop trading and determine daily opening and closing
prices, standard call auctions are conducted for most securities. In these opening and closing
auctions buy and sell orders are collected over a set interval in time, after which a clearing
∗Corresponding author. Email: m.j.m.derksen@uva.nl
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
07
58
3v
2 
 [q
-fi
n.T
R]
  2
8 N
ov
 20
19
price X is determined to clear the maximal executable volume [12], transacting all against
the price X.
A large part of the market microstructure literature focusses on detailed modelling of con-
tinuous double auctions and the limit order book. There are essentially two different lines
of work: equilibrium models in which order arrival is governed by decisions of individual
agents trying to maximize utility (see e.g. [21, 13, 14, 23, 5, 6] ) and stochastic limit order
book models in which order arrival is completely stochastic (see e.g., among many others,
[17, 24, 9, 1, 8, 20]). Some extensive studies of empirical properties of the limit order book
can be found in [3, 7, 4, 22]. The standard call auction has received less attention: [18] models
a call auction in which all orders have size one and are uniformly distributed over some price
interval, while buy and sell orders arrive c.f. a homogeneous Poisson process. The distribution
of transacted volume is derived, together with the clearing price expectation. Technically,
this paper is related to the work of [19], who gives the full solution of Mendelson’s call auction
model, deriving distributions for transacted volume, and lower/upper clearing prices, as well
as asymptotic distributions in very liquid call auctions.
At the conceptual level, our approach is related to the seminal paper by [24], who consider
a statistical model for continuous double auctions assuming i.i.d. random order flow, mod-
elled through independent, homogeneous Poisson processes for market orders, limit orders
and cancellations with random order-prices from a single, uniform valuation distribution.
Simulations, dimensional analysis and mean-field approximations then lead to predictions for
price volatility, market depth, price-impact function, bid-ask spread and probability/time to
fill a limit order.
In this paper we propose a model for price formation in financial markets with a bid/ask
equilibrium equation at its core, that sets the clearing price such as to lead to maximal
transacted volume, based on fixed numbers NA, NB of unit-sized sell and buy orders forming
i.i.d. samples from distinct valuation distributions FA and FB. Due to the randomness
in the orders, the equilibrium gives rise to a distribution for X|NA, NB, the clearing price
conditional on NA, NB. The shape of the valuation distributions FA, FB and the distribution
of the pair (NA, NB) remain unspecified; while the former models order density, the latter
permits great freedom of modelling order flow conditions, including auctions in which extreme
or skewed liquidity-conditions disturb equilibria and distort clearing prices. We derive closed-
form expressions for distributions of clearing prices, jointly with transacted volumes.
Such mechanisms have direct application in the modelling of opening and closing auctions as
demonstrated with data from intraday transactions to predict closing price distributions of
several constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index (roughly speaking, this index consists of the 50
main Eurozone companies) in section 6. Extending the argument more informally, we argue
that the model applies also in continuous trading: if buy/sell orders are accrued over a period
of time (and liquidity providers trade with a more-or-less neutral combined inventory) then,
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at the aggregate level, the detailed process of trading during the period can be interpreted
as market-clearing at a price X with a distribution that depends on valuation distributions
FA, FB and the distribution of the pair (NA, NB) that reflects order flow conditions during
the interval. If liquidity providers do not trade neutrally, or if we take a limit order book into
account, the equilibrium between newly accrued buy and sell orders is perturbed by so-called
excess liquidity, which can be taken into account in full generality and lies at the heart of
many interesting properties associated with real-world phenomena.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, the model is introduced,
probability distributions for clearing price and volume are derived and several proposals for
the order flow distributions are made. In section 3, we consider auctions in which the number
of incoming orders is very large. Asymptotically the clearing price has a normal distribution,
which implies that if we approximate continuous trading by a periodically cleared market,
the resulting discrete price process follows a Brownian path. This is roughly in support of
general pricing models based on the efficient market hypothesis, with mean and variance of
the return distribution expressed in terms of the distributions of supply, demand and order
flow. In section 4 we explore how changing supply and demand distributions affect the joint
distribution of clearing price and transacted volume, leading to a distinction between two
different types of auction price variance; one occuring when transacted volumes are high,
the other one when these are low. In section 5 we study the model’s perspective on the
price impact of market orders. Remarkably, the model reproduces the concave price impact
functions observed empirically [15, 16, 10] and explained theoretically [24, 11, 2]. In section 6
the model is applied to estimate the distribution of the clearing price of a closing auction,
based on the day’s transaction data. For 5 (randomly selected) constituents of the Eurostoxx
50 index, it is shown that the model predicts the probability distribution of the closing
price with precision, through assessment of QQ-plots and Kolgomorov-Smirnov statistics.
For comparison, a more crude alternative method of estimation is assessed on the same
basis. It is shown that the market clearing model provides significantly better estimates for
clearing price distributions than this more straightforward method. Most important results
are summarized in the concluding section 7. Proofs of the theoretical results of sections 2
and 3 as well as notation and conventions are collected in appendix A.
2 Stochastic market clearing
In this section, we introduce the model and derive expressions for the distributions of central
quantities in the clearing process.
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2.1 Supply/demand equilibrium
Let us consider a standard call auction for a given asset. In the auction, buy and sell orders
are matched to transact at a clearing price X, determined in such a way that the total
transacted volume is maximal. Suppose that NA sell orders are submitted, as well as NB buy
orders and that every order has equal size (set to one). We assume that participants on both
sides of the market formulate their orders independently of each other, according to certain
valuation distributions. That is, we model the ask prices as an i.i.d. sample (A1, . . . ANA) from
a supply (or ask) distribution FA and the bid prices as an i.i.d. sample (B1, . . . , BNB ) from a
demand (or bid) distribution FB. The interpretation of FA is as follows: the probability that
a randomly selected seller is willing to sell the asset for an ask price A ≤ x, is given by FA(x),
for all x ∈ R. Similarly, if we randomly select a buyer, the probability that he is willing to
buy the asset for a bid price B ≤ x is given by FB(x). Naturally ask prices are higher than
bid prices, however, the ordering is expressed through the supply and demand distributions
FA, FB, through the assumption that,
FA(x) = P(A ≤ x) ≤ P (B ≤ x) = FB(x) (1)
for all x ∈ X . Note that the general ordering of buy prices below sell prices cannot be defined
in very strict or deterministic ways; the uncertainty in A,B and the stochastic nature of
the ordering enables crossing prices and thereby, matchable orders and the auction itself.
For reasons of technical feasibility, it is assumed that buyers and sellers formulate their
quotes independently, i.e. bid- and ask-samples are independent i.i.d. samples. 1 Denote
by FB and FA the empirical distribution functions associated with the bid- and ask-samples
(B1, . . . , BNB ) and (A1, . . . , ANA), that is,
FB(x) =
1
NB
NB∑
j=1
1{Bj≤x}, FA(x) =
1
NA
NA∑
i=1
1{Ai≤x}.
For every x ∈ R, denote the number of submitted sell orders with a price less than or equal to
x by DA(x) and the number of submitted buy orders with a price greater than x by DB(x).
As discussed above, the clearing price X is obtained by maximizing the total transacted
volume. In terms of the above defined quantities, that implies X is defined as a solution of
the market clearing equation DA(X) = DB(X), or,
NAFA(X) = NB
(
1− FB(X)
)
, (2)
which expresses that the transacted volume is maximized at (any) price X where the supply
curve DA and the demand curve DB intersect. Consider the following definition.
1Of course these independence assumptions are not realistic: especially when prices fluctuate a lot, it is
likely that market participants on both sides of the market react on each other’s decisions and hence their
quotes are far from independent. However, we argue that, despite these simplifying assumptions, the model
can still be interpreted as a reasonable description of price formation in auctions, as is confirmed by the results
in Section 6.
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Figure 1: Three possible examples of the supply curve DA(·) (the increasing (red) step
function) and the demand curve DB(·) (the decreasing (blue) step function). Left upper
panel: a situation in which there is no unique point of intersection, note the position of X
at the left of the interval where DA = DB. Right upper panel: a situation in which there
is a unique intersection point, but DA(X) > DB(X). Lower panel: A situation in which no
transactions are possible, note the position of X at the highest placed buy order. Note also
the position of the transacted volume (V ) after clearing (this quantity is defined later on).
Definition 2.1 For a given sell order sample (A1, . . . ANA) from FA and a buy order sample
(B1, . . . , BNB ) from FB, the corresponding clearing price X is defined by
X = inf{x ∈ R : DA(x) ≥ DB(x)}.
Remark 2.2 It should be noted that there are issues of existence and uniqueness of solutions
to (2). Firstly, when the bid- and ask-samples are such that,
B1 ≤ · · · ≤ BNB < A1 ≤ · · · ≤ ANA
there is no solution where DA and DB intersect. Secondly, it is possible that there is an
interval [X
¯
, X¯] of possible clearing prices for which DA = DB, ruining uniqueness. Both
issues are addressed in definition 2.1, much in the same way quantiles of a distribution are
defined (see figure 1 for an illustration).
In subsequent subsections, closed-form expressions are provided for the probability distribu-
tions (conditional, given (NA, NB)) of several important market quantities, like clearing price
X and transacted volume V .
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While this stochastic model of price formation is based on the mechanism of a call auction, the
clearing price also has an interpretation for continuous trading. To appreciate the relation, the
process of continuous bidding and transacting (with matching of orders as an instantaneous
but momentary form of clearing) should be viewed in an aggregated form over an interval
of time I. During any such interval the numbers of buyers and sellers must still be equal,
and that is exactly what equation (2) expresses. Then, at the aggregate level, the detailed,
step-by-step process of trading during the interval may be modelled equivalently (or in close
approximation) as market clearing at a clearing price X associated with the interval I.
For both the auction and the continuous trading interpretations, the following applies: if
FA, FB and the distribution of (NA, NB) are chosen in an appropriate way, the clearing
price X can be interpreted as a true, underlying price for the asset, associated not with
any specific point in time but with the whole interval I (to relate such an interval-price to
timed market prices, one may think of X loosely as the price at a time T randomly sampled
from I). To justify the fixed distributions FA, FB and the independence assumptions on
the order samples, I must not be too long due to possible non-stationarity but long enough
statistically, aggregating a sufficiently large numbers of orders. Furthermore, the stochastic
behaviour of FA and FB (that is, the randomness these quantities represent) must reflect
the uncertainty in the incoming orders on the respective sides of the market during the time
interval I with some accuracy. Similarly the distribution chosen for liquidity (NA, NB) must
reflect the uncertainty in actual market liquidity conditions during the interval I. If these
conditions are met, the model will provide an accurate reflection of the stochastic aspects of
market clearing, and thereby, of price formation.
In the setting of continuous trading, it makes sense to measure time in terms of market
events rather than physical time, in particular regarding the interval I. Combining with the
interpretation of X as a true, underlying price for the interval I, we can fix N = NA + NB
and interpret the resulting clearing price X as a true, underlying asset price associated with
the interval spanned by the next N orders.
The unrestricted freedom in the choices for FA, FB and the distribution of (NA, NB) enables
use of empirical fits for these distributions from previous intervals. It is also possible to
make definite, default choices for these quantities: for instance, choosing independent Poisson
distributions for NA and NB would correspond to the assumption of Poisson order flow, which
is omnipresent in the literature (see, among many others, [24, 9, 1, 8, 20] for examples in
context of continuous double auctions and [18, 19] for examples in the standard call auction).
In subsection 2.4 we consider further possible choices for the distribution of (NA, NB) and
the model properties implied.
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2.2 Distribution of clearing price and volume
In this subsection we derive the probability distributions of price and price-volume, resulting
from the equilibrium equation (2), without and with a limit order book. We concentrate on
the marginal distribution of the clearing price X only first, given by the following theorem
(proved in the appendix).
Theorem 2.3 (Clearing price distribution) The distribution of the clearing price X, condi-
tional on NA and NB, is given by,
P(X ≤ x|NA, NB)
=
NA∑
k=0
NB∧k∑
l=0
(
NA
k
)
FA(x)
k(1− FA(x))NA−k
(
NB
l
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l.
However, it is also possible to derive the joint distribution of clearing price and transacted
volume, which is defined next.
Definition 2.4 The transacted volume V corresponding to the clearing price X, is defined
by V = DA(X).
Remark 2.5 The quantity V = DA(X) should be interpreted as the maximal number of
orders that can be matched in clearing. In the context of a call auction, it is the total volume
that is transacted. If FA andFB are continuous distributions, there is almost surely a unique
point where DA and DB intersect, hence V = DA(X) = DB(X). In the case of a discrete
price-axis it is possible that DA(X) > DB(X), which means that the volume DA(X) is not
completely matched (see the upper right panel of figure 1). As a convention, we neglect such
discretization effects and continue with definition 2.4 (compare with the resolution to the
ambiguity for X, as an infimum, see remark 2.2).
In the next theorem (proved in the appendix), an explicit expression for the joint distribution
of X and V is provided. It is assumed that the price-axis X is a discrete set, X := {x0, x0 +
δ, . . . }, where δ is the ticksize.
Theorem 2.6 (Joint clearing price/transacted volume distribution) The joint distribution of
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clearing price X and transacted volume V , conditional on NA and NB, is given by,
P(X ≤ x, V ≤ v|NA, NB)
=
v∑
u=0
u∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
[(
NB
l
)(
NA
k, u− k,NA − u
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l
× FA(x)k(FA(x+ δ)− FA(x))u−k(1− FA(x+ δ))NA−u
]
+
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
NA∑
u=v+1
u∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
[(
NB
l
)(
NA
k, u− k,NA − u
)
(1− FB(y))lFB(y)NB−l
× FA(y)k(FA(y + δ)− FA(y))u−k(1− FA(y + δ))NA−u
]
−
∑
y≤x
NB∑
l=0
NA∑
k=l∨v+1
(
NA
k
)
FA(y)
k(1− FA(y))NA−k
(
NB
l
)
FB(y)
NB−l(1− FB(y))l.
(3)
2.3 Excess liquidity
There are several variations possible on the definition of the clearing price X as given above:
to start with, during continuous trading, exchanges often offer an open limit order book,
which contains all visible limit orders on ask-side and bid-side. Denote by LA(x) the total
volume on the ask-side of the limit order book for a price less than or equal to x. Similarly,
denote by LB(x) the total volume on the bid-side of the limit order book for a price above
x. Then definition 2.1 of the clearing price X is adapted to,
X = inf{x ∈ R : DA(x) + LA(x) ≥ DB(x) + LB(x)},
corresponding to an adapted market clearing equation that takes the limit order book into
account:
NAFA(X) + LA(X) = NB
(
1− FB(X)
)
+ LB(X), (4)
Note that x 7→ LA(x) and x 7→ LB(x) are non-stochastic quantities and that for any x, either
LA(x) or LB(x) is equal to zero (as, otherwise, the book could be cleared further by matching
the overlapping orders).
To generalize, we include excess liquidity as any sort of liquidity that plays a role in the
clearing process, but does not originate from the quoting process as described by FA and FB.
As such, we view excess liquidity as an external influence.
Definition 2.7 If the clearing price X is defined by the equation,
NAFA(X) = NB
(
1− FB(X)
)
+ ∆(X), (5)
where ∆ : X → Z is a right-continuous, non-increasing function, then ∆ is called the excess
liquidity.
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Excess liquidity takes the market out of the ‘pure’ equilibrium given by DA(X) = DB(X).
For example, inclusion of the limit order book is possible through ∆(x) = LB(x) − LA(x).
Positive values of ∆(x) correspond to an excess demand and negative values of ∆(x) mean
an excess supply. Another example of excess liquidity is the arrival of a market order. A
sell market order of size ω ∈ N corresponds to the constant function ∆ = −ω1X , while a
buy market order is described by the function ∆ = ω1X . Similarly, a buy limit order with
limit price b can be described by ∆ = ω1[x0,b] and a sell limit order with limit price a by
∆ = −ω1[a,∞).
Lemma A.1 can be re-derived with excess liquidity, in order to obtain the equivalence X ≤
x ⇔ DA(x) ≥ DB(x) + ∆(x). Exactly like in the proof of theorem 2.3, this leads to the
distribution of the clearing price, conditional on NA and NB, as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.8 (Clearing price distribution in case of excess liquidity) When excess liq-
uidity x 7→ ∆(x) plays a role, the clearing price distribution conditional on NA, NB, is given
by
P(X ≤ x|NA, NB)
=
NA∑
k=0
U(k,x)∑
l=0
(
NA
k
)
FA(x)
k(1− FA(x))NA−k
(
NB
l
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l,
where U(k, x) = (k −∆(x)) ∧NB.
Note that the limit order book makes an appearance only in the summation bound, leaving
the binomial character of the equilibrium distribution intact.
2.4 Order flow distributions
All the distributions derived in the previous subsections, are conditional on the pair (NA, NB).
In this subsection we discuss some possibilities for the distribution of (NA, NB) (the so-called
order flow distribution) and their consequences for clearing price distributions. The common
assumption in the (early) literature is what is called Poisson order flow : for continuous
double auctions [24, 9, 1, 8, 20] and call auctions [18, 19], Poisson order flow follows from
assumed independent Poisson processes for the arrival of buy and sell orders. Here, we would
take,
(NA, NB) ∼ Pois(µAT )× Pois(µBT ),
for Poisson rates µA, µB and a given interval duration T to achieve the same.
However, in this setting it makes sense to consider more general models for order flow. Assume
again that we consider an interval in which N new orders arrive. Fix NA + NB =: N ∈ N
9
and leave the distribution of NA open for choice. A reasonable choice would be to choose NA
according to binomial order flow, i.e.
NA ∼ Bin(N, p),
for some p ∈ (0, 1) representing order flow imbalance. Taking,
(NA, NB) ∼ Pois(µA)× Pois(µB),
is equivalent to,
N = NA +NB ∼ Pois(µA + µB), NA|N ∼ Bin(N, p),
for p = µA/(µA + µB).
Both Poisson and binomial proposals express the conviction that order flow imbalance α :=
NA/N does not display great stochastic fluctuation and lies close to its expectation p, es-
pecially for greater values of N due to the central limit theorem. This makes it difficult to
capture market phenomena that are due to fat tails in the order flow distribution, to describe
more extreme, yet common market conditions. Hence our third proposal: we consider beta
order flow imbalance,
NA = αN, α ∼ Beta(β1, β2).
Choice of the parameters β1, β2 permits great modelling freedom. For instance, if we expect
the order flow on the bid- and ask-side to be roughly balanced, it is appropriate to set β1 = β2.
If we expect the market to be out of balance (e.g. while trending), we may choose β1 > β2
when we expect more supply than demand, and vice versa. Perhaps most interesting is the
scale of the betas: if β1, β2 < 1 we induce the fat tails not seen in Poisson or binomial order
flow, while β1, β2  1 will lower the variance and bring α close to its expectation β1/(β1+β2).
To shed more light on the influence of the order flow distribution on the clearing price
distribution, we consider a simple example. To focus on order flow, we make the trivial
choices for the other parameters: FA(·) = FB(·) = Φµ,σ(·) for µ = 10 and σ = 0.1. To
appreciate the effects of order flow on clearing price distributions, consider figure 2, the
probability density fX of the clearing price is plotted for various balanced (left panel) and
unbalanced (right panel) choices of the order flow distribution. As expected, fX centers
around 10 in all balanced cases and around a lower location for the unbalanced cases. It
is seen that Poisson order flow leaves little room for variation in the values of NA and NB,
causing the density to peak relatively sharply. By contrast, beta order flow imbalance leads
to more liquidity-driven uncertainty in the clearing price.
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Figure 2: Clearing price density fX , for FA = FB = Φ10,0.1 and various balanced
(left panel) and unbalanced (right panel) choices for the order flow distribution.
The solid black line is the density for Poisson order flow, while the dashed blue
line and the dashed green line correspond to beta order flow imbalance, for fixed
N = 100.
3 The high-liquidity limit
In this section, we provide the asymptotic clearing price distribution in limit of infinite
liquidity. To be more precise, denote N = NA +NB, let NA = αN , NB = (1−α)N for some
constant 0 < α < 1 we refer to as order flow imbalance and consider the limit N → ∞. We
take a continuous price-axis X = [x0,∞) and assume that the distribution functions FA and
FB are strictly increasing, describing measures that are absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure, with densities denoted fA and fB. Let X denote a solution to
NAFA(X) = NB(1 − FB(X)) + ∆(X), with possibly non-zero excess liquidity ∆. Denote
by xE the real equilibrium price which is the (non-random) price uniquely defined by the
equilibrium equation,
αFA(xE) = (1− α)(1− FB(xE)). (6)
According to the following theorem (the proof of which can be found in the appendix), the
clearing price X is in the limit distributed according to a normal distribution centred on xE
with variance that depends on fA and fB.
Theorem 3.1 (High-liquidity clearing price distribution) Let X be the clearing price in case
of possible excess liquidity ∆. Assume that FA and FB are strictly increasing and absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure with densities fA and fB. Additionally,
assume that excess liquidity scales with N as ∆(·) = √ND(·), for some continuous and
bounded function D : X → R. Then, as N →∞,
√
N(X − xE) w.−−→N(µ(xE), σ2(xE)), (7)
where the asymptotic mean and standard deviation are given by,
µ(xE) =
D(xE)
αfA(xE) + (1− α)fB(xE) , σ(xE) =
τ(xE)
αfA(xE) + (1− α)fB(xE) ,
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for
τ2(xE) = αFA(xE)
(
1− FA(xE)
)
+ (1− α)FB(xE)
(
1− FB(xE)
)
,
and xE is the real equilibrium price.
Consider a standard call auction in which the number of orders collected is very large. The
clearing price distribution is then closely concentrated around xE and has a width propor-
tional to 1/
√
N . So the model confirms the intuition that large auctions lead to accurate
price discovery and adds that this accuracy is inversely proportional to the square root of the
number of orders. Non-zero excess liquidity of order
√
N biases X away from xE , however,
this bias is also proportional to 1/
√
N . So the model says that in highly liquid auctions or
markets, external influence in the form of excess liquidity ∆ must be of order larger than√
N to force (the distribution of) the clearing price away from the real equilibrium price xE .
Furthermore, the shift caused by the excess liquidity is inversely proportional to a convex
combination of fA and fB, hence price impact will be larger if the density of orders around
the equilibrium price is low.
Next consider the case of continuous trading of a stock in an interval, during which supply and
demand are described by the distributions FA and FB, and by order flow imbalance α ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that the number of incoming orders during the interval is very large, so that the limit
of theorem 3.1 forms a good approximation for the clearing price distribution. In the absence
of excess liquidity, the distribution of the clearing price associated with the interval is a
sharply peaked normal distribution centred at the real equilibrium price. If we repeat this
argument for consecutive intervals (possibly with changing FA, FB and α) and approximate
continuous trading by a periodically cleared market, the price process becomes a discrete
Brownian path (possibly trending if we add excess liquidity). In many stochastic models for
pricing, this type of stochastic process is postulated; by contrast, here, the Brownian path
emerges from the central limit (in the form of Donsker’s theorem, see the proof of theorem 3.1)
and the parameters of this Brownian path have an interpretation in terms of supply, demand
and order flow imbalance.
As argued after definition 2.7, the model invites the interpretation of the limit book as excess
liquidity, in a market made around the equilibrium price xE of many new orders. Think, for
instance, of a situation where new orders originate from liquidity providers primarily; if the
location of their equilibrium price distribution undergoes a small but quick jump (for example
because of a sudden change in the price of a hedging index future), the result of theorem
3.1 suggests that the limit book obstructs immediate market correction: if we consider a
limit book of order greater than N1/2 over an interval of order N orders, the location of the
clearing price distribution is expected to differ from the liquidity providers’ new xE on scales
larger than N−1/2. To re-phrase that slightly and more crudely, the model suggests that a
limit book offering total liquidity of order L stabilizes the market price versus fluctuations in
valuation distributions or order flow imbalance, if those fluctuations vary quickly enough to
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neutralize over a duration of order L2 (where time is measured in volume offered). 2
Finally, note that the variance in (7) is not only dependent on τ2(xE) in the way one might
expect, but like the location in (7), it is inverse proportional to a liquidity-weighted convex
combination of fA and fB, evaluated at the real equilibrium price. So the volatility of the
Brownian path (as well as the influence of excess liquidity) goes down in ranges where orders
are concentrated and goes up in ranges where orders are sparse. Consequently, the Brownian
path has long occupation times in ranges where orders are dense.
Remark 3.2 [19] derives a normal asymptotic distribution of the clearing price in a similar
setting, under the assumption of Poisson order flow (i.e. N ∼ Pois(λT ), where λT → ∞,
NA ∼ Bin(N,α)) and FA = FB = F . The Poisson order flow with λT → ∞ represents a
fixed randomization of the deterministic N → ∞ discussed here. However in the proof he
firstly considers (in our notation) fixed N and NA = αN and finds an asymptotic normal
distribution for X, with mean F−1(1−α) and standard deviation√α(1− α)f(F−1(1−α))−1.
Setting FA = FB = F and D = 0 in our result, the solution to (6) is xE = F
−1(1 − α),
τ2(xE) = α(1− α) and σ(xE) =
√
α(1− α)f(xE)−1.
4 Supply-demand distributions, price and volume
In theorem 2.6 we derived the joint distribution of the clearing price X and the corresponding
transacted volume V , given supply and demand distributions FA, FB and volumes NA, NB.
In this subsection we explore the dependence of the distribution of (X,V ) on FA and FB.
We shall fix NA and NB as equal constants (NA = NB = 50 in the examples below). It is
also recalled that the distribution for (X,V ) was derived in a setting with a discrete price
axis X with ticksize δ > 0 (below, we take δ = 0.01); normal distributions are discretized
accordingly.
4.1 Varying consensus between bid- and ask-side
The supply and demand valuation distributions FA, FB express a difference of opinion con-
cerning the valuation of the asset. Sell orders are typically priced higher than buy orders,
a fact expressed in a stochastic way, through equation (1). We first consider how shifts of
locations for FA, FB influence the joint distribution of clearing price and volume.
We consider three different choices of the supply and demand distributions, denoted FA, FB,
F¯A, F¯B and F˜A, F˜B:
FA = Φ10.1,0.1, FB = Φ9.9,0.1, F¯A = Φ10.05,0.1, F¯B = Φ9.95,0.1, F˜A = F˜B = Φ10,0.1. (8)
2Note that these
√
N scales originate from the central limit (more specifically, Donsker’s theorem) and that
is it a topic of further research to verify these exact scales empirically.
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The first case represents a relatively large difference between the locations of supply and
demand distributions, while the second case represents a small difference, and the third
complete consensus. In all three cases, the real equilibrium price is xE = 10, however, as can
be seen from the left panel of figure 3,
FA(xE) < F¯A(xE) < F˜A(xE). (9)
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Figure 3: Left panel: distribution functions of supply/demand. Solid lines
FA, FB; dashed lines F¯A, F¯B; dashed-dotted lines F˜A, F˜B. Right panel: sums of
densities of supply/demand. Solid line fA + fB; dashed line f¯A + f¯B; dashed-
dotted line f˜A + f˜B.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of price-volume in these three cases and suggests the fol-
lowing, intuitively reasonable mechanism: as the locations of supply and demand distribu-
tions diverge, marginally the transacted volume drops, while the width of the price marginal
increases. Note that the location on the price-axis does not change, as all three (X,V )-
distributions are centred around xE = 10. Referring to theorem 3.1, the result reflects the or-
dering expressed by (9): in the high-liquidity limit, X lies close to xE and V = NAFA(X) (re-
spectively, V¯ = NAF¯A(X), V˜ = NAF˜A(X)) lies close to NAFA(xE) (respectively, NAF¯A(xE),
NAF˜A(xE)). Similar arguments regarding the ordering of densities (see also the right panel
of figure 3),
fA(xE) + fB(xE) < f¯A(xE) + f¯B(xE) < f˜A(xE) + f˜B(xE),
provide an asymptotic explanation for the observed increase in price uncertainty (c.f. the
denominator of the variance in (7); the numerator is bounded and plays no role here). To
re-phrase and summarize: when consensus between bid- and ask-sides increases, transacted
volume increases and price uncertainty decreases.
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(a) Density for (X,V ) with valuation dis-
tributions FA = Φ10.1,0.1, FB = Φ9.9,0.1.
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(b) Density for (X,V ) with valuation
distributions F¯A = Φ10.05,0.1, F¯B =
Φ9.95,0.1.
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(c) Density for (X,V ) with valuation dis-
tributions F˜A = F˜B = Φ10,0.1.
Figure 4: The influence of consensus between bid- and ask-side of the market
on the distribution of (X,V ). Note: as the locations of supply and demand
distributions diverge, transacted volume drops, while price uncertainty increases.
15
4.2 Increased uncertainty among market participants
Here we investigate the influence of valuation uncertainty among market participants on the
distribution of clearing price and transacted volume: we consider three different choices of
the supply and demand distributions, denoted FA, FB, F¯A, F¯B, F˜A, F˜B,
FA = Φ10.1,0.1, FB = Φ9.9,0.1, F¯A = Φ10.1,0.2, F¯B = Φ9.9,0.2, F˜A = Φ10.1,0.3, F˜B = Φ9.9,0.3.
(10)
The locations of supply and demand distributions are maintained, while their variances are
increased, reflecting growing uncertainty in valuation among individual market participants.
Again, in all three cases, the real equilibrium price is xE = 10 and (9) continues to hold (see
the left panel of figure 5).
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Figure 5: Left panel: distribution functions of supply/demand. Solid lines
FA, FB; dashed lines F¯A, F¯B; dashed-dotted lines F˜A, F˜B. Right panel: sums of
densities of supply/demand. Solid line fA + fB; dashed line f¯A + f¯B; dashed-
dotted line f˜A + f˜B; dotted line
¯
fA +
¯
fB.
Panels (b), (c) and (d) of figure 6 show the distributions of price-volume in these three
cases and suggests the following, reasonable-sounding (but incomplete, see below) rule: as
the variance of the valuation distributions increases, marginally both transacted volume and
price uncertainty increase. Note that the location on the price-axis does not change, as all
three (X,V )-distributions have marginals centred around xE = 10. The asymptotic argument
for the observed ordering V < V¯ < V˜ continues to hold. Note in the right panel of figure 5,
however, that with locations and variances as chosen,
fA(xE) + fB(xE) > f¯A(xE) + f¯B(xE) > f˜A(xE) + f˜B(xE),
so that asymptotic variance of the clearing price increases when valuations become more
widely spread (referring again to the variance in (7)).
But this explains only half of the mechanism that the model ascribes to the relation between
valuation uncertainty and auction price variance. To appreciate the other half, consider a
fourth different pair
¯
FA,
¯
FB of supply and demand distributions that reflects less valuation
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(a) Density for (X,V ) with valuation
distributions
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FA = Φ10.1,0.075,
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FB =
Φ9.9,0.075.
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(b) Density for (X,V ) with valuation
distributions FA = Φ10.1,0.1, FB =
Φ9.9,0.1.
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(c) Density for (X,V ) with valuation dis-
tributions F¯A = Φ10.1,0.2, F¯B = Φ9.9,0.2.
9.925 9.95 9.975 10.0 10.025 10.05 10.075
0
5
10
15
20
25
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
v
x
(d) Density for (X,V ) with valuation dis-
tributions F˜A = Φ10.1,0.3, F˜B = Φ9.9,0.3.
Figure 6: The influence of valuation uncertainty among market participants on
the distribution of (X,V ).
uncertainty among market participants, defined by
¯
FA = Φ10.1,0.075,
¯
FB = Φ9.9,0.075.
As can be seen from the right panel of figure 5, this choice of valuation distributions satisfies
¯
fA(xE) +
¯
fB(xE) < fA(xE) + fB(xE),
which implies that the asymptotic variance of the clearing price also increases when we lower
the variance of the valuation distributions. This is also confirmed by panel (a) of figure
6, where the distribution of price-volume for
¯
FA,
¯
FB is shown. To explain this observed
inversion, consider FA and FB that are two normal distributions of equal variance σ
2 > 0,
located at µ1, µ2 ∈ R. Reasoning again asymptotically, the denominator of the expression for
the variance in (7) equals,
fA(xE) + fB(xE) =
√
2
pi
1
σ
exp
(
−1
2
(µ1 − µ2)2
σ2
)
. (11)
As a function of σ, (11) has a maximum at σ = 12 |µ1−µ2| (see figure 7 for an example), which
means that asymptotic variance of the clearing price is minimal at said level of valuation
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uncertainty σ. When σ rises above 12 |µ1 − µ2|, as in figure 6, panels (c) and (d), auction
price variance increases; perhaps somewhat surprisingly, when σ decreases below 12 |µ1 − µ2|,
as in figure 6 panel (a), auction price variance also increases. The heuristic reason for this
inversion is as follows: when consensus between the bid- and ask-side of market is very low
(large |µ1 − µ2|) and valuation uncertainty among market participants is minimal (small σ),
orders around xE are very scarce, so that clearing prices are based on small numbers of
matchable orders, therefore displaying high variance; as the uncertainty in order prices on
both sides increases, more orders appear around xE , lowering the variance of the clearing
price. The added valuation uncertainty ‘unlocks’ an otherwise illiquid market, in which
buyers and sellers rarely cross. So in a market with illiquidity-driven price movements, raised
valuation uncertainty aids accurate price discovery.
Combination with the previous subsection invites the following, intuitively reasonable conclu-
sion: observation of high levels of price variance can be driven by illiquidity or by valuation
uncertainty among market participants; observation of the price and its fluctuations alone
does not distinguish between those cases. To differentiate one must involve transacted vol-
ume, which is moderate when price variance is minimal, low in illiquid markets and high in
markets with valuation uncertainty-driven price variance.
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σ
Figure 7: fA(xE) + fB(xE) as a function of σ, for fA = φµ1,σ, fB = φµ2,σ, where
µ1 = 10.1, µ2 = 9.9 and xE = 10. Note this function attains its maximum at
σ = 12 |µ1 − µ2| = 0.1, implying that the asymptotic clearing price variance of
equation 7 attains its minimum at this σ.
5 Impact of market orders
In definition 2.7 the clearing price in the presence of excess liquidity ∆ is defined and its
distribution is provided in proposition 2.8. Modelling the arrival of market orders as excess
18
liquidity, this subsection compares clearing prices with and without market orders. Differ-
ences between clearing price distributions form the model’s perspective on the price impact
of market orders, a subject that has received quite some attention in the literature (see e.g.
[15, 16, 24, 10, 11, 2] and references therein).
Consider again the case that FA = FB = Φµ,σ, for µ = 10, σ = 0.1 and (NA, NB) ∼ Pois(50)2.
Departing from the case that this market is in equilibrium, next suppose that a market order
of size |ω| arrives: as in eq. (5), we add an excess liquidity term to model this, in the form of
constant functions ∆(x) = ω, where ω > 0 corresponds to a buy order and ω < 0 represents a
sell order. In figure 8 the resulting clearing price distributions are plotted for various ω. The
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Figure 8: Clearing price densities, when market orders of sizes |ω| are placed
(negative ω for sell orders, positive for buy orders). The supply and demand
distributions are equal and normal, FA = FB = Φµ,σ, for µ = 10, σ = 0.1,
while (NA, NB) ∼ Pois(50)2. Note that orders of size |ω| = 2 do not significantly
influence the price distribution, but orders of sizes |ω| = 10 or 20 shift the clearing
price distribution noticeably.
common definition of the price impact function δp(ω) is the size of the shift in market price
when a market order of size ω arrives. Empirical studies (see e.g. [10, 15, 16], among many
others) have shown that, in the situation of a continuous double auction, the price impact
function is concave, and certain models confirm this concavity (see e.g. the seminal paper by
[24], or more recent work in this area [2, 11]). To consider the matter in our model, we define
the price impact function δp(ω) as the shift in expectation of X when a buy market order
of size ω > 0 arrives. Figure 9 shows price impact functions for various supply and demand
distributions that display the expected concavity. Furthermore, the picture shows that price
impact becomes less concave as supply and demand distributions are shifted together, with
the case FA = FB almost linear. This difference is explained by the number of orders that
can be expected around EX. In the case FA = FB, EX lies around xE = 10 and all orders lie
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Figure 9: Price impact δp as a function of the size ω of the market order, for
various supply and demand distributions FA, FB. In all casesN = 100, NA = αN ,
α ∼ Beta(2, 2).
around 10. In cases where the locations of FA and FB differ, EX lies between them, while buy
orders concentrate around a lower price and sell orders around a higher one. In that situation
fewer orders lie around EX and consequently the clearing price is impacted more significantly
in such regions; by contrast, in regions where orders are more concentrated, the clearing price
is less easily moved. Comparing with [24], their model produces an almost linear price impact
function for a situation in which there is a large accumulation of orders near the market price
and a very concave price impact function with lower levels of accumulation near the market
price.
6 Prediction of the closing price distribution
For a quantitative model, a convincing statistical demonstration of applicability is ultimately
the only possible proof of relevance. Below we perform this statistical exploration: we con-
sider the statistical quality of the model’s clearing price distributions in daily closing auctions
for five (randomly selected) Eurostoxx 50 index constituents with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
goodness-of-fit test, and find that they explain the randomness in observed closing prices
well. More specifically, we use a day’s transactions to estimate clearing price distributions
for daily closing auctions of five shares over the course of the trading year 2017. We assume
that we have observed the market until 5 pm and then want to predict the closing price
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distribution.3To assess performance, we keep track of the quantiles of realized closing prices
according to the estimated clearing price distribution: if the estimates are accurate (and
approximately independent), these quantiles form an approximate i.i.d. sample from the uni-
form distribution on [0, 1]. The match is assessed graphically, through QQ-plots, and tested
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. As a simple benchmark, the results are compared
with results from a log-normal model.
6.1 Estimation of the closing price distribution
To obtain the daily estimator for the clearing price distribution, we first need estimators
for the supply- and demand-distributions FA and FB. As we want to predict the closing
price distribution FX before the start of the closing auction, it is not an option to use quote
data from the closing auction itself. Instead, intra-day transaction data is used: throughout
the trading day, all transactions are recorded in a book that aggregates total volume traded
for any price tick in the daily price range. In fact, two such books are kept, distinguished
by the side of the market that initiated the trade. Half an hour before market close these
books are normalized and converted into histogram-like estimators for the densities fA and
fB. Expressed cumulatively, this leads to ‘empirical distributions functions’ FˆA(·) and FˆB(·)
that serve as estimators for FA and FB. Essentially we use a volume-weighted version of the
day’s transacted orders to estimate market participants’ valuations. This leads to reasonable
estimators, based on the idea that the intra-day valuations of market participants will be
reflected in their valuations in the closing auction.
For any choice of NA, NB, these daily estimators can be used to estimate the distribution for
X|NA, NB, that day’s clearing price given order flow NA, NB. Because FˆA(·) and FˆB(·) are
supported on the range of prices visited that day, the clearing price distribution is supported
on that range too. This causes a disadvantage of the proposed equilibrium model: regardless
of the order flow, the model does not predict anything outside the daily price range and the
estimator should be viewed as a ‘windowed’ or conditioned device, relevant only conditional
on auction prices that fall inside the daily price range. To model order flow, we convolute
with an order flow marginal in which N is fixed and NA = αN , with α distributed according
to a Beta-distribution. Because we have no reason to assume asymmetry, only the scale β > 0
in α ∼ Beta(β, β) varies. To not exclude the possibility of fairly extreme, one-sided order
flow (where NA  NB or vice versa with high probability), we keep β < 1 (this is empirically
3The choice of the prediction time of 5 pm is not completely arbitrary. We have found empirically that
around 90% of the closing prices falls within a range of 30bps of the last mid-price, and that the closing price
is generally very close to the last mid-price. Hence, there is not much to predict when we wait until the closing
auction starts, as the last mid-price is then more informative than our prediction. Of course we could start
prediction already before 5 pm, but then the quality of the estimators will get worse, as less transaction data
is observed.
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verified, see remark 6.2 below).
Definition 6.1 The daily estimated clearing price distribution is the distribution FˆX that
results from theorem 2.3 with empirical supply and demand FA = FˆA, FB = FˆB, convoluted
with the order flow distribution.
In all examples below, we choose N = 100 and β = 0.75 and note that these choices appear
to work well for the five Eurostoxx 50 index constituents considered below.
Remark 6.2 It is important to note that the model is robust with respect to these choices.
The choice of N is not very important: at first sight N has a very clear interpretation as the
number of orders in the auction, however it should be noted that the order size of orders is
not modelled, hence changing N could also be interpreted as changing the order size. As long
as N is taken sufficiently large to allow for enough diversification in the orders (already for
N > 50) the choice of N does not really affect the result, as the large liquidity limit starts to
do its work. 4 These claims are supported by figure 13. The choice of β has more influence
on the results, as it determines how many mass is shifted into the tails of the distribution.
But still, the model is robust with respect to small variations in β, which is expressed by
figure 14. Estimation of the parameter β is also interesting: one can take the n previous
closing auctions of the stock and compute the ratio NANA+NB , i.e. the total volume of all sell
orders in the closing auction, divided by the total volume of all orders. 5 Then one obtains
a sample of n order flow imbalances, which can be treated as an i.i.d. sample to find the
parameter of the Beta-distribution, by computing moment estimators. We did this analysis
for three of the five Eurostoxx 50 index constituents considered below. 6 For Airbus SE we
found βˆ = 0.8057, for Engie SA we found βˆ = 0.8219 and for Anheuser Busch Inbev NV we
found βˆ = 0.6988, empirically justfying the observation that β should be picked around 0.75.
As an example, consider figure 10, an (arbitrarily selected) day’s trading in ING stocks
and the estimate of the closing price distribution FˆX (based on FA, FB that are estimated
from daily transaction data until 5 pm). Note the inhomogeneity of the estimated density.
The following statistical analysis shows that this detailed shape with peak and troughs is
informative for the realized closing price, meaning that the closing price is more likely to be
realized on prices where the estimated density is higher, which is nicely illustrated in the
above example by the closing price that realizes on one of the peaks in the estimated density.
4There is also an easy way to estimate N : around 28% of the daily total transacted volume is transacted
in the closing auction (in 2017, nowadays it is more), so one could take the total transacted volume until 5
pm and turn this into an estimator for N using this ratio. However, figure 13 shows that this analysis is not
worthwile, as a different choice of N does not impact the results.
5In fact, the order book contains a lot of irrelevant volume far from the eventual closing price. This volume
does not contribute to the determination of the closing price and should not be counted in the estimation.
Instead, we only counted orders within ten levels of the closing price.
6One needs full order book data to do the estimation, which is provided for the stocks traded on Euronext,
but not for the German stocks Bayer AG and Deutsche Telekom AG.
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Figure 10: Estimation of the closing price distribution, based on daily transaction
data. Left panel: ING stock price during a trading day in 2017. Right panel: the
estimated distribution of the closing price X, where the distributions of supply
and demand are taken to be the empirical estimators of FA and FB (based on
the data until 5 pm) and where N = 100, NA = αN , α ∼ Beta(0.75, 0.75).
6.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test
To assess performance, we predict closing price distributions for the circa 250 trading days
in 2017. Because the model only concerns the daily trading range, we do not include those
trading days on which the stock’s closing price lay outside the daily trading range. Typically,
trading on such days is highly momentum-driven and is not well-represented by equilibrium
models, at least, on daily or shorter time-scales. After removing the days where the price
closed outside the daily trading range, this leads to samples of 200-230 trading days for the
selected five stocks. As the valuation distributions FA, FB differ from day to day, there is no
straightforward way to assess the accuracy of the sample of estimated clearing price distribu-
tions FˆX . For that, we need a standard, distribution-free argument based on the observation
that if X ∼ FX , then F−1X (X) ∼ U [0, 1]: if FˆX approximates FX well on any trading day,
Fˆ−1X (X) has a distribution approximating U [0, 1]. In our statistical experiment we have a
sequence of predictions Fˆi for closing prices Xi (assumed independent) with true marginal
closing price distributions Fi (which are possibly very different as the day i varies). If the
estimators Fˆi approximate the Fi well, the resulting sequence ξˆi = Fˆ−1i (Xi) is distributed
approximately as an i.i.d. sample from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Below, this de-
gree of approximation is assessed graphically through QQ-plots and tested with statistical
significance using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov(KS) statistic. This statistical assessment is not
just a technically convenient choice, what is assessed in this way is highly relevant to daily
market practice: good QQ-plots and KS-statistics indicate that clearing price distribution
estimators provide an accurate picture of the relation between quoted price and probability
of execution in the auction (conditional on a closing price inside the price range seen during
the day). For example, from a trader’s perspective, the estimated quantiles could give rise to
a trading strategy that goes long/short when the market price lies in the low/high quantiles
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half an hour before the market closes. From an investor’s point of view, the pth percentile of
the clearing price distribution answers the question at which price to quote in the auction to
be for p% sure that the order gets transacted.
To have a simple benchmark for comparison we also consider an alternative: we include
a benchmark model that assumes that the daily log-return is normally distributed, with
mean and variance estimated by (volume-weighted) average and variance of log-prices of
transactions during the day. The resulting estimated closing price distribution F˜i is truncated
to that day’s trading range. This leads to samples of 200−230 quantiles ξ˜i = F˜−1i (Xi), subject
to the same requirement of similarity to an i.i.d. sample from the U [0, 1]-distribution. The two
samples ξˆi (resulting from the market clearing model) and ξ˜i (resulting from the log-normal
model) are assessed for uniformity by QQ-plots in figure 11.
Table 1 reports the associated KS-statistics and p-values. (Note that the KS-test does not
fall within the standard Neyman-Pearson framework of statistical testing, basically because
one seeks to confirm the null-hypothesis. This changes the usual interpretation of p-values:
if a model has a low p-value in this context, the hypothesis that it is correct is rejected
based on the data with high statistical significance. By contrast, a model with a high p-value
requires a high degree of relaxation of significance criteria before the correctness hypothesis is
rejected based on the data.) The model of log-normal daily returns proves wholly inadequate
Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and corresponding p-values for the samples of quan-
tiles ξˆi (resulting from the clearing model) and ξ˜i (resulting from the log-normal model) for
five (randomly selected) constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index.
Stock Model KS-statistic p-value
1. Engie SA Market clearing 0.0392 0.905
Log-normal 0.147 2.04*10−4
2. Airbus SE Market clearing 0.0320 0.988
Log-normal 0.164 3.76*10−5
3. Bayer AG Market clearing 0.0326 0.983
Log-normal 0.139 6.96*10−4
4. Anheuser Busch Inbev NV Market clearing 0.104 0.0198
Log-normal 0.175 4.61*10−6
5. Deutsche Telekom AG Market clearing 0.0304 0.989
Log-normal 0.0837 0.0969
as an explanation of the randomness observed in actual closing prices: only in the example
of Deutsche Telekom is it possible to argue that (truncated) log-normal distributions for the
daily returns form a prediction that is informative about closing prices at the distributional,
predictive level. Furthermore, figure 11 shows that the log-normal model underestimates the
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tail of the closing price distributions in all five examples. By contrast, the QQ-plots for the
market clearing model show a very decent match for uniformity, indicating that the model
is a good representation of the randomness in observed closing prices. Estimated clearing
price distributions provide an accurate picture of the relation between quoted price and
probability of execution (conditional on an auction price that falls within the daily trading
range). This is confirmed by associated KS-statistics and their p-values in table 1: four
out of five samples show exceptionally straight lines in their QQ-plots, confirmed by the
exceptionally high p-values in Table 1. The exception (recall, these five stocks have been
selected randomly from the Eurostoxx 50 index) is the Anheuser Busch Inbev NV stock,
with a KS-statistic that indicates evidence (p = 0.0198) to reject the null-hypothesis and
visual inspection through the QQ-plot reveals underestimation of the up-side tail. One could
wonder how the market clearing model performs if the extreme beta distribution for order flow
imbalance is replaced by Poisson order flow (this essentially corresponds to the call auction
model of [19]). To investigate this option, we performed exactly the same analysis using the
estimated clearing price distribution (as in definition 6.1) to obtain a sample of quantiles,
but now with Poisson order flow: (NA, NB) ∼ Pois(50) × Pois(50). Figure 12 shows the
corresponding QQ-plot for one of the stocks (Airbus SE), similar results are obtained for the
other stocks. The Poisson order flow, expressing the conviction that the orderflow imbalance
α does not display great stochastic fluctuation around α = 12 , leads to a clearing price
distribution that extremely underestimates the tails (even worse than the log-normal model).
It turns out that the extreme order flow distributions are necessary to capture the tails of
closing price distributions, underlining the limitations of Poisson order flow.
We conclude that the detailed shape of estimated clearing price distributions from the market
clearing model (with peaks and troughs as in the right panel of figure 10) is informative for
the relation between the price of an order and the corresponding execution probability, while
uni-modal shapes like those of the log-normal distribution are not. Furthermore, we conclude
that Poisson order flow does not display enough stochastic fluctuation to capture the tails of
the observed randomness in closing prices, emphasizing the relevance of extreme order flow
distributions.
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3a. Bayer AG, market clearing
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3b. Bayer AG, log-normal
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4a. AB Inbev NV, market clearing
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4b. AB Inbev NV, log-normal
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5a. Deutsche Telekom AG, market
clearing
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Figure 11: QQ-plots of the samples of quantiles of closing prices (vertical axis)
against theoretical U [0, 1]-quantiles(horizontal axis), for the market clearing
model and the log-normal model, for 5 Eurostoxx 50 index constituents.
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Figure 12: QQ-plot of the sample of quantiles of closing prices of Airbus SE
(vertical axis) against theoretical U [0, 1]-quantiles(horizontal axis), for the market
clearing model with (NA, NB) ∼ Pois(50)× Pois(50).
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7 Conclusions
In this article we propose a model for auction price distributions in standard call auctions
based on a balance between two samples of random orders. The model assumes i.i.d. samples
of buy- and sell-orders, placed following demand- and supply-side valuation distributions.
An equilibrium equation (fixing the clearing price by requiring that the number of buyers
equals the number of sellers) then leads to a distribution for clearing price and transacted
volume. Bid- and ask-side volumes are left as free parameters (order flow); a choice for the
distribution of these parameters (possibly heavy-tailed or very skewed) leads to distributions
for clearing prices and transacted volumes, with or without a limit order book.
In the highly liquid auctions of section 3, the clearing price distribution converges to a normal
central limit, with mean and variance in terms of supply/demand-valuation distributions and
order flow imbalance. Most importantly, the variance of the limiting normal distribution
at real equilibrium price x is inversely proportional to the density of orders around x. The
interpretation is in regions on the price axis where price variance is suppressed due to density
of orders.
In subsection 2.4, we consider the influence of order flow on clearing price distributions.
Restriction to models involving Poisson or binomial assumptions concerning the amount of
liquidity on offer is hard to justify. As confirmed empirically in section 6, extreme or skewed
order flow conditions are equally important. Section 4 explores the influence of valuation
distributions with some illustrative simulations: for example, bringing valuation distributions
closer together increases transacted volume and decreases price variance. Closer inspection
of the price/volume distribution reveals that there are two fundamentally different types of
price variance, one driven by illiquidity and the other by valuation uncertainty among market
participants. To differentiate, one must involve transacted volume, which is moderate when
auction price variance is minimal, low in illiquid markets and high in markets with valuation
uncertainty-driven price variance.
In section 5, we analyse the model’s description of market impact. Remarkably, the model
produces a concave price impact function, especially when the valuation distributions are
widely separated, reflecting a market in which the consensus is low. This is in line with
empirical results [15, 16, 10] and with the theoretical results of [24].
To statistically verify the validity of the model and estimates of the daily closing price dis-
tributions in section 6, we predict a year’s worth of daily closing-price distributions for five
constituents of the Eurostoxx 50 index; Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics and QQ-plots demon-
strate with ample statistical significance that the model predicts closing price distributions
accurately, and compares favourably with a simpler, log-normal, alternative method of pre-
diction. We conclude that the model’s predicted clearing price distributions explain the
observed randomness in closing prices well, confirming that the proposed model provides a
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proper description of price formation in call auctions.
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A Notation and proofs
Notation and conventions
We denote the multinomial coefficient for n ≥ 3 by(
n
k1, . . . , kn
)
:=
n!
k1! . . . kn!
.
The binomial distribution with parameters n and p is denoted Bin(n, p), the Poisson distri-
bution with parameter λ is denoted by Pois(λ), the uniform distribution on [0, 1] is denoted
by U [0, 1] and the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 is denoted by N(µ, σ2)
with cumulative distribution function Φµ,σ(·). Convergence in distribution is denoted w.−−→ .
Let X ⊂ R be the price-axis which can be either discrete or continuous. The lowest possible
price is denoted by x0 := inf X . The valuation distributions for supply and demand prices,
denoted FA and FB, are assumed to be distributions on the price-axis.
Proofs
The expressions we derive for price and price-volume distributions hinge on the following
two lemmas, which convert finding a solution to eq. (2) into a question involving binomial
distributions.
Lemma A.1 For any x ∈ R, we have the equivalence: X ≤ x⇔ DA(x) ≥ DB(x).
Proof The left implication follows immediately from the definition of X, so suppose X ≤ x.
Note that x 7→ DA(x) is non-decreasing and x 7→ DB(X) is non-increasing. So the set
{y ∈ R : DA(y) ≥ DB(y)} is of the form (a,∞) or [a,∞), for some a ∈ R. Through their
definitions, DA and DB are right-continuous, so we can write,
DA(a) = lim
z↓a
DA(z) ≥ lim
z↓a
DB(z) = DB(a).
Therefore {y ∈ R : DA(y) ≥ DB(y)} = [a,∞), which implies that a = inf{y ∈ R : DA(y) ≥
DB(y)} ≤ x. Hence x ∈ [a,∞) = {y ∈ R : DA(y) ≥ DB(y)}, which proves the result. 
The independence assumption for (A1, . . . , ANA) and (B1, . . . , BNB ) directly implies the con-
tent of the following lemma.
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Lemma A.2 For every x ∈ X , (DA(x),DB(x)) is a pair of independent, binomially distributed
random variables,
(DA(x),DB(x)) ∼ Bin(NA, FA(x))× Bin(NB, 1− FB(x)). (12)
These two lemmas imply the following explicit expression for the clearing price distribution
in terms of the distributions of supply and demand, FA and FB, conditional on NA and NB.
Theorem 2.3 (Clearing price distribution) The distribution of the clearing price X, condi-
tional on NA and NB, is given by,
P(X ≤ x|NA, NB)
=
NA∑
k=0
NB∧k∑
l=0
(
NA
k
)
FA(x)
k(1− FA(x))NA−k
(
NB
l
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l.
Proof From lemma A.1 and the independence of DA(x) and DB(x) it follows that,
P(X ≤ x) = P(DA(x) ≥ DB(x)) =
NA∑
k=0
P(DB(x) ≤ k|DA(x) = k)P(DA(x) = k)
=
NA∑
k=0
NB∧k∑
l=0
P(DB(x) = l)P(DA(x) = k),
where conditioning on NA, NB has been omitted for ease of notation. The result follows from
lemma A.2. 
Similarly, we derive the joint distribution of (X,V ) from eq.(2). Recall that the price-axis X
is a discrete set, X := {x0, x0 + δ, . . . }, for some δ > 0.
Theorem 2.6 (Joint clearing price/transacted volume distribution) The joint distribution of
clearing price X and transacted volume V , conditional on NA and NB, is given by,
P(X ≤ x, V ≤ v|NA, NB)
=
v∑
u=0
u∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
[(
NB
l
)(
NA
k, u− k,NA − u
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l
× FA(x)k(FA(x+ δ)− FA(x))u−k(1− FA(x+ δ))NA−u
]
+
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
NA∑
u=v+1
u∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
[(
NB
l
)(
NA
k, u− k,NA − u
)
(1− FB(y))lFB(y)NB−l
× FA(y)k(FA(y + δ)− FA(y))u−k(1− FA(y + δ))NA−u
]
−
∑
y≤x
NB∑
l=0
NA∑
k=l∨v+1
(
NA
k
)
FA(y)
k(1− FA(y))NA−k
(
NB
l
)
FB(y)
NB−l(1− FB(y))l.
(3)
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Proof In order to characterize the transacted volume V in a similar sense as the clearing
price in Lemma A.1, define the generalized inverses D−1A and D
−1
B of DA and DB by
D−1A (v) := F
−1
A (v/NA) = inf{x ≥ 0 : DA(x) ≥ v},
D−1B (v) := F
−1
B (1− v/NB) = inf{x ≥ 0 : DB(x) ≤ v},
where F−1A ,F
−1
B are the generalized inverses of the empirical cumulative distribution functions
FA,FB (for a distribution function F , its generalized inverse is defined as F−1(p) = inf{x ∈
R : F (x) ≥ p}, for p ∈ [0, 1], see e.g. [25], Chapter 21). For a given distribution function F ,
its generalized inverse satisfies
F−1(p) ≤ x⇔ p ≤ F (x),
which implies
D−1A (v) ≤ x⇔ v ≤ DA(x), D−1B (v) ≤ x⇔ v ≥ DB(x). (13)
It follows from equation (13) that V is characterized by the following equivalences.
V ≤ v ⇔ DA(X) < v + 1⇔ X < D−1A (v + 1)⇔ X ≤ D−1A (v + 1)− δ, (14)
which leads to
X ≤ x, V ≤ v ⇔ X ≤ min(x,D−1A (v + 1)− δ).
So we can write
P(X ≤ x, V ≤ v) = P(X ≤ min(x,D−1A (v + 1)− δ))
= P(X ≤ x,D−1A (v + 1)− δ > x)
+ P(X ≤ D−1A (v + 1)− δ,D−1A (v + 1)− δ ≤ x)
= P(X ≤ x,D−1A (v + 1) > x+ δ) +
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(X ≤ y,D−1A (v + 1) = y + δ).
(15)
Here, and in remainder of the proof, we have omitted the conditioning on NA, NB in the
notation, for convenience. We start with the first term in this expression. From lemma A.1
and (13) it follows that
P(X ≤ x,D−1A (v + 1) > x+ δ) = P(DA(x) ≥ DB(x),DA(x+ δ) < v + 1)
=
v∑
u=0
P(DA(x) ≥ DB(x),DA(x+ δ) = u),
where, by independence of the bid- and ask-samples,
P(DA(x) ≥ DB(x),DA(x+ δ) = u)
=
u∑
k=0
P(DB(x) ≤ k)P(DA(x) = k,DA(x+ δ) = u)
=
u∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
[(
NB
l
)
(1− FB(x))lFB(x)NB−l × NA!
k!(u− k)!(NA − u)!FA(x)
k
× (FA(x+ δ)− FA(x))u−k(1− FA(x+ δ))NA−u
]
,
(16)
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which gives the first term of the solution in equation (3).
Now we turn to the second term in equation (15), for which we write∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(X ≤ y,D−1A (v + 1) = y + δ)
=
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(X ≤ y,D−1A (v + 1) ≤ y + δ)−
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(X ≤ y,D−1A (v + 1) ≤ y)
=
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(DA(y) ≥ DB(y),DA(y + δ) ≥ v + 1)
−
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(DA(y) ≥ DB(y),DA(y) ≥ v + 1),
(17)
where the last line follows by Lemma A.1 and equation (13). The first term of this expression
equals
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(DA(y) ≥ DB(y),DA(y+δ) ≥ v+1) =
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
NA∑
u=v+1
P(DA(y) ≥ DB(y),DA(y+δ) = u)
and its expression follows from equation (16), by substituting y for x. This gives the second
term of the solution in equation (3). Finally, consider the second term in equation (17), which
equals
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
P(DA(y) ≥ DB(y),DA(y) ≥ v+1) =
∑
y∈X ,y≤x
NB∑
l=0
P(DA(y) ≥ max(l, v+1))P(DB(y) = l),
by independence of the bid- and ask-samples. Using the binomial distributions of DA(y) and
DB(y) once more, we see that this equals the last term in the solution of equation (3), which
concludes the proof. 
Theorem 3.1 (High-liquidity clearing price distribution) Let X be the clearing price in case
of possible excess liquidity ∆. Assume that FA and FB are strictly increasing and absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure with densities fA and fB. Additionally,
assume that excess liquidity scales with N as ∆(·) = √ND(·), for some continuous and
bounded function D : X → R. Then, as N →∞,
√
N(X − xE) w.−−→N(µ(xE), σ2(xE)), (7)
where the asymptotic mean and standard deviation are given by,
µ(xE) =
D(xE)
αfA(xE) + (1− α)fB(xE) , σ(xE) =
τ(xE)
αfA(xE) + (1− α)fB(xE) ,
for
τ2(xE) = αFA(xE)
(
1− FA(xE)
)
+ (1− α)FB(xE)
(
1− FB(xE)
)
,
and xE is the real equilibrium price.
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Proof The assumption that FA and FB are continuous implies that the steps of DA and
DB all have size 1, almost surely. So we have, almost surely,
NAFA(X) = NB(1− FB(X)) + ∆(X).
Combination with (6) yields,
NA(FA(X)− FA(xE)) = −NB(FB(X)− FB(xE)) + ∆(X),
which, after introduction of FA(X) and FB(X), reads,√
NA
NB
(FA(X)− FA(X)) +
√
NA
NB
(FA(X)− FA(xE))
= −
√
NB
NA
(FB(X)− FB(X))−
√
NB
NA
(FB(X)− FB(xE)) + ∆(X)√
NANB
.
(18)
Now denote
ZA,NA(x) =
√
NA(FA(x)− FA(x)), ZB,NB (x) =
√
NB(FB(x)− FB(x)).
By Donsker’s theorem (see e.g. [25], Theorem 19.3) and independence of the bid- and ask-
samples, it holds that
(ZA,NA(x), ZB,NB (x))
w.−−→N(0, FA(x)(1− FA(x)))×N(0, FB(x)(1− FB(x))),
as NA, NB → ∞, uniformly over x ∈ R (and hence for every random X). Using NA =
αN,NB = (1− α)N and D(x) = ∆(x)/
√
N , we can rewrite (18) as follows,√
α
1− α(FA(X)− FA(xE)) +
√
1− α
α
(FB(X)− FB(xE))
= − 1√
N(1− α)ZA,NA(X)−
1√
αN
ZB,NB (X) +
D(X)√
N(1− α)α.
Hence, we obtain the following weak limit,
√
N
τ(X)
(
α(FA(X)− FA(xE)) + (1− α)(FB(X)− FB(xE))
)
− D(X)
τ(X)
w.−−→N(0, 1), (19)
where the asymptotic variance τ2(X) is given by,
τ2(X) = αFA(X)(1− FA(X)) + (1− α)FB(X)(1− FB(X)).
With the help of the distribution function FR, defined by the convex combination,
FR(·) = αFA(·) + (1− α)FB(·),
we rewrite equation (19) as follows,
1
τ(X)
(√
N(FR(X)− FR(xE))−D(X)
) w.−−→N(0, 1).
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Since 0 < τ(X) < 1 and D is bounded, we conclude that FR(X) converges to FR(xE) in
probability. The assumptions on FA and FB ensure that FR has a Lebesgue density fR and
that FR is invertible with continuous inverse F
−1
R : [0, 1]→ R, so it follows that X converges
to xE in probability. By continuity it follows that τ(X) converges in probability to τ(xE)
and D(X) to D(xE). By Slutsky’s Lemma (see e.g. [25], Lemma 2.8), we arrive at,
√
N(FR(X)− FR(xE)) w.−−→N(D(xE), τ2(xE)).
The Delta-method (see e.g. [25], Theorem 3.1) then leads to,
√
N(X − xE) w.−−→ (F−1R )′(FR(xE))N(D(xE), τ2(xE)),
where, according to the inverse function theorem,
(F−1R )
′(FR(xE)) =
1
fR(xE)
.

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Figure 13: How the choice of N affects the results of section 6, for the case of
Deutsche Telekom AG (similar effects are observed for the other stocks). It is
seen that the choice of N does not really impact the results, as long as N is
sufficiently large (N > 50).
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Figure 14: How the choice of β affects the results reported in section 6, for
the case of Deutsche Telekom AG (similar effects are observed for the other
stocks). It is seen that the results are robust with respect to the choice of
β ∈ (0.65, 0.85).
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